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THE RACE CARD AND CALIFORNIA POLITICS:

MINORITY VOTERS AND RACIAL CUES IN THE
2003 RECALL ELECTION

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As recently as 2002, pundits and scholars considered California out of reach for Republicans. Democrats controlled both houses of the state legislature; they were a majority of the congressional delegation, including both U.S. Senators; and they held all statewide offices from insurance commissioner to governor. It was suggested that this dominance by Democrats was largely caused by the political aftershocks of the race-targeting wedge issue politics employed by Republicans in the early and mid-1990s. Moderate whites and the growing minority vote were turned off by the divisive Republican agenda in the state and thus secured the state for the Democratic Party.

If California was truly a Democrat-dominated state, then how can we explain what happened during the 2003 recall election? In the October 2003 special election, neither the incumbent Democrat governor nor the Democrat replacement candidate were able to ward off the successful Republican surge for the highest statewide office. Although Democrats were perceived to enjoy dominance in state politics, their control, while broad, was tenuous. In sweeping the eight top statewide offices in 2002, the Democratic margin of victory was razor thin. Some contests, such as controller, were decided by less than 1 percent of the vote, which meant that even small changes in public opinion could result in a big difference in the election outcome. The answer to the recall question, we argue, has to do with the dual role of minority voters and racial cues in the recall election. More specifically, we contend that the political behavior of racial/ethnic voters and the use of racial cues were significant factors in determining the outcome of the two-stage process during the 2003 California recall election. The 2003 special election to recall Governor Gray Davis featured a renewed focus on racial issues and ethnic candidates. Opponents of Davis made campaign issues out of his support for driver’s licenses for noncitizens and his association with Native American casino money. Meanwhile, four of the five top replacement candidates for governor were from first- or second-generation immigrant families leading many pundits to speculate on the role that minority voters would play in the recall election. Pollster Mark Baldassare noted, “Minority voters in California have proven the winning edge for Democratic candidates in the past ... and for the recall their vote will be a huge issue” (Sterngold 2003).

The remainder of this chapter is divided into four sections. First, we focus on the contemporary growth of minority voters in California politics. We then compare the role of racial cues during the recall campaign and during the 1990s. The third section draws on survey research to shed light on the difference in votes by race and ethnicity, which is followed by an examination of the racial/ethnic gap that emerged in voter preferences, evidenced by precinct-level analyses in Los Angeles County. Finally, we consider the implications of these differences for elite behavior and future election outcomes in California.

THE MINORITY VOTE IN CONTEXT

Over the past twelve years, minority voters have become a larger part of the California electorate, growing by almost 70 percent from 1990 to 2000, according to estimates from the U.S. Census Current Population Survey (CPS). In addition to population growth, this increase is in large part due to successful mobilization drives targeting Latino and Asian voters (Michelson 2003; Pachón 1998; Pantoja and Woods 2000; Ramírez 2002; Wong 2001). In 1990, whites accounted for 82.3 percent of all voters in statewide elections, compared with just 17.7 percent for Latino, black, and Asian voters combined. However, each year between 1990 and 2000 the minority share of the electorate grew and, by the 2000 presidential election, it stood at 29.8 percent. This growth primarily is the result of increases in Latino and Asian American voter registration and turnout, while black voting has remained roughly the same.

Minority participation reached a high in the 2000 presidential election and then fell in the 2002 gubernatorial election. Although turnout was low statewide, minorities were even less likely to vote in 2002, feeling alienated from their traditional Democratic base (Barabak 2002). Thus, in 2002, the minority share of the California electorate decreased for the first time in ten years, falling an estimated 4 percentage points from just two years earlier. With increased mobilization and the frenzy surrounding the 2003 recall, minority turnout was up in 2003 as compared with 2002 (Tomás Rivera Policy Institute 2002, 2003). Despite increased turnout in the recall election, levels of support for Democratic candidates were down among Latinos, blacks, and Asians.

Statewide victories by Democrats in the 1990s have been made possible by support from minority voters. In particular, Democrats have been successful in ten of eleven of the elections for governor, U.S. Senate, and president between 1992 and 2002 (Fraga and Ramírez 2003; Fraga, Ramírez, and Segura 2004). Six of those ten Democrat victories would have been defeats without the support of minority voters. In virtually every major election since 1992, minority voters were more likely to vote Democrat than were white voters.
A majority of African American and Latino voters consistently voted Democratic at rates of 15 to 30 percentage points higher than white voters. The average of the Democratic vote in ten elections among whites is 45 percent, while the average among Latino, black, and Asian voters was 69 percent, 80 percent, and 54 percent, respectively. Latino voters grew consistently more Democratic during the early to mid-1990s and sustained high levels of Democratic support in 1996 (75% for Clinton), 1998 (71% for Davis), and 2000 (75% for Gore). This increase of about 10 percentage points coincides with the Republican-backed, race-targeting propositions discussed below that many viewed as anti-immigrant and anti-Latino (California Journal 1998; Fraga and Ramírez 2003).

While minority voters contributed to the success of most Democratic candidates who went on to win in California, it seems that white voters may hold the real key to victory. The only unsuccessful Democrat in that race (Brown, in 1994) saw her support dip to only 35 percent among white non-Hispanic voters, despite strong support from Latino and black voters. While less likely to vote Democrat than minorities, whites voted at least 40 percent Democrat in the nine elections that Democrats won. The reason white voters are so influential lies in their willingness to turn out and vote. Although California is a majority-minority state measured by total population (53% minority in the 2000 U.S. Census), whites are, and will likely continue to make up the majority of the electorate for some time (Citrin and Highton 2002).

**Race as an Election Issue: The Good, The Bad, and the Ugly**

With one of the most diverse state populations in the country, such issues as illegal immigration and bilingual education were important in shaping California’s political landscape during the 1990s and have also shaped huge controversies in state politics. In the new century, the same pattern emerged as racial issues played an important role in the 2001 Los Angeles mayoral election. The promise of retaining the city’s African American police chief helped secure the black vote for the Anglo candidate, while alleged support for an imprisoned Latino drug dealer badly hurt the Latino candidate in the eyes of moderate white voters. Over the past ten to fifteen years, California politics has become synonymous with racial and ethnic politics, even as white voters constitute a large majority of the electorate. Here, we highlight the racial overtones that were present during the 2003 recall election. While some references to race are seen as positive, others are clearly negative, and worse yet, border on racist campaigning.

**The Good**

*Candidates as Immigrants*  Arnold Schwarzenegger, Cruz Bustamante, Ariana Huffington, and Peter Camejo (and to a lesser extent Van Vo; see HoSang and Masuoka, Chapter 9 in this volume). One of the most interesting elements about the recall election was that four of the top five candidates were immigrants or children of immigrants. Rather than seeing it as a negative, media accounts emphasized the positive aspects of the immigrant work ethic by these candidates, and their potential to mobilize immigrant voters in all communities. Candidates were portrayed as embodying the American dream, and immigrant voters were seen as an important swing vote, not as a threat.

**Proposition 54 as a Deracialized Initiative**  Proposition 54, the racial privacy initiative was not “racialized” in advertisements. While, in the past, race-based ballot initiatives have attracted heated debate in minority communities and on AM talk radio, Proposition 54 was portrayed as both a privacy issue and a health care issue by proponents and opponents, effectively deracializing its context. Although many observers expected it to have a similar impact as previous propositions (for example, Propositions 187, 209, and 227), in the end, a majority of Anglo and minority voters rejected the initiative as an attack on medical research instead of viewing it as a so-called wedge issue. This demonstrates the potential maturity of the California electorate to not fall victim to race baiting. However, other race issues did prevail.

**The Bad**

**History of Race as a Campaign Issue (Propositions 187, 209, and 227)**  The mid-1990s witnessed three race-targeting statewide initiatives that sought to deny undocumented immigrants access to social services, eliminate state-sponsored affirmative action programs, and end the use of bilingual education in the public school system. All three of these propositions were successful based on the election choice of white voters. It would have taken 100 percent minority voter opposition, and the exhibited white voting patterns, for these initiatives to narrowly defeat these voter initiatives (by 1% to 4%). The election outcomes using this majoritarian electoral device in California highlight the role that race can have on the election choice of white voters (Hajnal and Louch 2001; Ramírez 2002). Clearly, these race-targeting initiatives and issues do not occur in a vacuum. Not only did these initiatives qualify for the ballot, they were used by politicians as campaign issues, further dividing the state along racial and ethnic lines. During the 1990s, the voting patterns were structured by the racial and ethnic composition where white voters lived. Tolbert and Hero (1996) demonstrate that support for Proposition 187 was highest in counties with significant minority populations. Similarly, Ramírez (2002) finds that white public opinion regarding Proposition 209 (the anti-affirmative action statewide initiative) was structured by the demographic diversity in state assembly districts where whites lived and by the extent to which white assembly districts were adjacent to majority-minority districts.

**The Ugly**

*Native American Casinos as a Threat to California*  As the state found itself in the middle of a severe budget shortfall, the leading Republican candidates Schwarzenegger and McClintock turned to Indian gaming as a
source of revenue. However, the issue was not simply portrayed in financial terms. Attack ads against Davis and Bustamante emphasized their close ties to Native American casino entrepreneurs and the large contributions made to their respective campaigns. By some accounts, the campaign commercials made it appear that Native Americans, who account for less than 1 percent of California's population, were running the top two offices in California. The message of the commercials was clear, that Native American casinos were not paying their fair share of taxes, and that they had undue influence over state politics because of their special treatment by Democratic leaders. Although California voters approved the terms of Indian gaming (twice) via state ballot propositions, and despite the history of their massacre by early California settlers during the gold rush (the state has even passed a resolution apologizing for historic treatment of Native Americans), Native Americans were depicted as taking advantage of the state in 2003. Nevertheless, campaign commercials attacked Native Americans as greedy and even suggested they were to blame for the state's financial crisis by not paying their share of taxes to the state (which voters had previously agreed was to be none).

In particular, Schwarzenegger was able to effectively distance himself from Indian gaming while at the same time closely tie Bustamante to Native American interest groups and campaign donations. This was largely possible because of the attention drawn to the Indian tribes because of their prominent role in campaign contributions during the recall election. In fact, $1 in $5 spent on the recall came from these contributions. Following the release of the campaign commercials, a national, nonpartisan Native American association criticized the ads. "On behalf of the National Indian Gaming Association, I denounce the advertisements currently being played on California television stations, which are paid for by Californians for Schwarzenegger. While the National Indian Gaming Association is a nonpartisan organization that does not take a position in party politics, we are personally deeply offended by the tenor of Mr. Schwarzenegger's ad" (Nicholas 2003).

**Lieutenant Governor Cruz Bustamante's Membership in a "Racist" Organization** In an effort to paint the moderate, Central Valley Democrat as a radical politician, opponents claimed Bustamante's association with his college MEChA (Movimiento Estudiantil Chicano de Aztlán) group signified that he was a racist, only concerned with Latino issues. The organization is a student-run group that promotes Mexican American awareness and is open to students of all backgrounds. Most notably, Tom McClintock, Republican candidate for governor, focused on a poor translation of the group's motto and insisted the lieutenant governor had a hidden Latino agenda that would exclude whites. Given that most non-Latinos in the state were unfamiliar with MEChA, they were prone to believe the attacks, especially when Bustamante defended the organization. Bustamante attempted to correct his opponents' depiction of MEChA and insisted he was not a racist. However, his refusal to apologize for his membership added to the discontent and suspicion among moderate and conservative white voters (for a richer account, see DeSipio and Masuoka, Chapter 8 in this volume).

**Driver's Licenses for Undocumented Immigrants** A final blow to the Davis administration may have been his decision to sign the driver's license bill authored by Democratic State Senator Gil Cedillo, after previously vetoing it twice. The bill provided a mechanism for undocumented immigrants to obtain a California driver's license, as long as they had been in the United States for three years, had a steady job, and passed a background check. In 1992, former Governor Pete Wilson signed a bill that prevented undocumented immigrants from getting licenses, which they had previously been able to obtain. According to his supporters, Cedillo's bill reversed the 1992 law in the interest of public safety and welfare. Davis angered some in the Latino community when he twice vetoed a similar bill. When he signed the bill in 2003, many Latinos and non-Latinos questioned his sincerity and believed that he was pandering to Latinos solely as a last ditch effort to retain his post. Ultimately, this lead to a backlash among some non-Latino voters and simultaneously failed to garner additional support among Latino voters. Republican candidates Schwarzenegger and McClintock campaigned on the promise that they would immediately repeal the law, because undocumented (Latino) immigrants posed a security threat if they could get their hands on a valid state driver's license, and polls revealed there was great public opposition to the driver's license bill.

**California Public Opinion and Race**

Leading up to the recall election, a majority of Californians were dissatisfied with Governor Davis' leadership and performance in office. Even following his successful reelection in 2002, polls suggested that voters were unhappy with both choices, Davis and his Republican opponent Bill Simon, leaving Davis' approval rating below 50 percent even after winning office (Barabak 2002). Therefore, it should not be viewed as a surprise that support for Davis was low among all racial and ethnic groups in 2003. A large survey of all four major ethnic groups in California was conducted just before the October 7 election to determine what differences of opinion existed among whites, Asian Americans, Latinos, and blacks (Table 7.1). To obtain a representative sample of minority voters, the 2003 Multilingual Survey of California Voters was offered in English, Spanish, Mandarin, Cantonese, Vietnamese, and Korean.

The results presented in Table 7.2 suggest that white voters were the most disillusioned with Davis, but that all four ethnic groups were unhappy. While 60 percent of whites had a negative opinion of the governor, a substantial percentage of Asian Americans (48%) and Latinos (49%) had a negative opinion. Even among blacks, more than a quarter held a negative opinion of Davis. Furthermore, a majority of all groups felt that Davis' job performance as governor was mediocre or poor, with white voters being the most likely to rate him poorly. While there was dissatisfaction with Davis, there was also cynicism of the recall election itself. More than 50 percent of all racial groups in California viewed the recall as a political circus as opposed to a good example
of democracy. Latinos and blacks were the most likely to have a pessimistic view of the recall election. The opinion data presented in Table 7.2 show consistency among the four groups, but the data also show that some groups (such as Latinos and blacks) hold stronger opinions.

Table 7.2 Patterns of public opinion on race issues by race/ethnicity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>WHITE</th>
<th>ASIAN</th>
<th>LATINO</th>
<th>BLACK</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>How important is the issue of racial discrimination?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Very important</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somewhat</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not at all</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Have you or family experienced racial discrimination?</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Race relations in California</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improving</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worsening</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staying same</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to assessing opinions about Davis and the recall election, the survey asked voters about racial discrimination and race relations in California. These questions provide an interesting insight into the significance of race as an issue in California politics. As demonstrated by Barreto, Segura, and Woods (2004), attitudes on racial issues are important predictors of behavior in California. They found that ten years after the Rodney King riots, race issues were still salient, and nearly half of all residents of Los Angeles were concerned that a race riot similar to the 1992 riot could occur between 2002–07. Thus, it is important to establish the prevailing attitudes on race-related issues and how they differed among the racial groups in California during the 2003 recall election.

As demonstrated in Table 7.2, racial discrimination is still considered a relevant issue in the twenty-first century by California voters, especially among minorities. While just over half of white voters said discrimination was a very important issue, the percentages of Asian, Latino, and black voters who viewed discrimination as very important was much higher. Almost 70 percent of Asian Americans, 80 percent of Latinos, and 86 percent of blacks felt discrimination was a significant issue. When asked whether they or their family had experienced discrimination, minorities were twice as likely to report that they had. Just 18 percent of whites experienced discrimination compared with 39 percent of Asians, 40 percent of Latinos, and 44 percent of blacks. Thus, for a large segment of California’s electorate, racial discrimination is a real issue. Finally, when asked about the future of race relations, there was a sense of tempered optimism, with some differences by race. Latinos and Asians were the most likely to view relations as improving, while more blacks felt relations were worsening. Taken in full, these numbers suggest that race and ethnicity have the capacity to play a role in California politics. The only question is whether voters follow these race cues.
### Table 7.3 Average democratic vote 1992–2002 and recall preference 2003.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>GROUP</th>
<th>AVERAGE</th>
<th>S.D.</th>
<th>LOWER 95%</th>
<th>UPPER 95%</th>
<th>RECALL</th>
<th>CRUZ</th>
<th>BUSTAMANTE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>White</td>
<td>44.8</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>47.9</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latino</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>65.7</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>80.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>75.9</td>
<td>84.7</td>
<td>79</td>
<td>65</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>58.5</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: S.D. = standard deviation.

* More than two standard deviations away from the mean.

Two points are notable about the levels of Democratic support in the recall election. First, only Latinos maintained equal support for Democrats on both parts of the ballot, voting to retain Davis and elect Bustamante at virtually the same rate. Every other ethnic group witnessed a sharp drop in support for Bustamante as the replacement candidate for governor, as compared to their no vote on the recall. Although blacks were more likely to vote for Bustamante than Latinos were, there was a large inconsistency between their vote for Davis and Bustamante, the two top Democrats in the election. Second, the difference between the average Democratic vote, and the vote for Bustamante is considerably outside the expected vote range. None of the support levels for Bustamante are in the predicted 95 percent confidence range that the ten-year history of previous voting projects. What’s more, for all ethnic groups, the vote for Bustamante was more than two standard deviations away from their mean levels of support for Democrats in state elections, including four standard deviations away for white voters. While most of the negative attention was on the state’s top Democrat, Davis—so negative, in fact, that he was facing a recall petition—it was Bustamante who received significantly lower than expected levels of support.

Although the exit poll results presented above provide a nice overview of voting patterns by race and ethnicity in California, some have called into question the reliability of the numbers for each subgroup (DiCamillo and Field 2003; Pachon and Barreto 2003). While the overall statewide percentages are very accurate (a margin of error of 2 points), the sample size for each ethnic group is smaller, making the margin of error larger (Latino ±4.3; black ±6.2; Asian ±6.2) and creating the potential for uncertainty. In addition to the margin of error issue, the sampling objective is to get a random and representative sample of the entire state, not one particular ethnic group. To alleviate these concerns, we offer a second strategy for assessing minority voting patterns in the California recall election: precinct level analysis.

Of all the fifty-eight counties in California, none is larger or more diverse than Los Angeles County, making it the ideal point of departure for studies of ethnic voting (for example, Barreto, Segura, and Woods 2004; Ramirez 2002). For each of the 1,781 precincts in Los Angeles, we compare the vote results for the recall to the adult population by race. This establishes a statistical and graphic presentation of voting trends by race in California, which makes it clear that racial voting differences do exist.

For the two main questions on the ballot—the recall of Davis and the replacement governor—we have created an XY scatterplot where the X axis is percent population (for each ethnic group) and the Y axis is vote preference. In addition, we have overlaid the regression line for each group indicating the slope. While the main scatterplot data is for the recall vote, for ease of comparability, we include the Bustamante vote regression line (dashed) in the same graph. Overall, the scatterplots confirm the trends in the exit poll data, that is, black and Latino voters were more supportive of Davis and Bustamante than were white and Asian American voters. In addition, as precincts become more heavily black and Latino, the vote results also become more consistent, suggesting that these groups are more likely to block vote as compared with whites and Asians. For example, Figure 7.1 does not show a clear upward or downward vote trend in relation to the white population. While the regression lines do show a downward slope, there are some heavily white precincts that voted 80 percent against the recall and some that voted 80 percent in favor of the recall. For replacement governor, there appears to be somewhat more block voting among whites in opposition to Bustamante. Among precincts that have no white voters, the lowest marks Bustamante received were 40 percent, while in heavily white precincts, he received as low as only 5 percent of the vote. Furthermore, the regression slope for Bustamante is much lower than for the recall (Davis), suggesting that Bustamante received even less support than Davis did among white voters.

While there are only a handful of heavily Asian American precincts, as demonstrated in Figure 7.2, the picture that emerges is similar to that for whites.

![Figure 7.1 Scatterplot of voting behavior for white precincts (Los Angeles county, 2003 recall election).](image-url)
As precincts become more heavily Asian, support levels for Davis hover around the middle of the chart, with some voting to recall and some voting to retain the governor. With respect to the Bustamante vote, Asian precincts demonstrate the same trend, but support levels are somewhat lower than for Davis. Overall, white and Asian American precincts were somewhat more likely to vote in favor of the recall and somewhat less likely to vote for Bustamante, although many outliers exist.

The scatterplots depict a clearer relationship between race and vote in the recall election with respect to Latinos and African Americans. First, the Latino population chart (Figure 7.3) clearly resembles a triangle, with a wide base that comes to a point where precincts approach 90 to 100 percent Latino, and, second, both trend lines are noticeably upward. In both the recall and the replacement governor election, heavily Latino precincts were much more likely to side with the Democrats, Davis and Bustamante. Further, while non-Latino precincts displayed a wide range in support levels, predominantly Latino precincts were consistent in their vote preferences. On the recall question, Latino precincts ranged only from 70 to 80 percent against, compared with white precincts who varied widely in both support and opposition (Figure 7.1). Similarly, Latino precincts all came out in strong support for Bustamante at rates of 65 to 75 percent.

African American precincts demonstrated the highest rates of opposition to the recall initiative at 75 to 85 percent, with every precinct that was greater than 80 percent black voting 80 percent No on the recall. However, there appears to have been considerably less support for Bustamante in black precincts than for Davis. According to Figure 7.4, heavily black precincts supported Bustamante at a rate between 40 and 50 percent, over 30 percentage points lower than their opposition to the recall. While the exit poll shows strong support for the lieutenant governor among African American voters (65%), Bustamante never received more than 52 percent of the vote in any of the predominantly African American precincts in the county, even as these same precincts voted 80 percent or more against the recall of Davis.
CONCLUSION—LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

Leading up to the recall election, observers of California politics argued that the "minority vote will be more critical in this election than in any election in the past 25 or 30 years" (Sterngold 2003). While the minority vote did not impact the outcome, racial and ethnic politics did play a significant role in the election, as we have outlined in this chapter. Focusing on the voting trends of Latino, Black, and Asian voters is only half of the puzzle of California politics. The other half, we argue, is the role of racial issues and campaign appeals by candidates during the election, which may mobilize or demobilize minority and, perhaps more importantly, white voters. Because they continue to represent a majority of the voting pool, the reaction of white voters to racial issues is a crucial factor in any California election. In the case of Proposition 54, the racial privacy initiative, race-based claims failed to resonate with Anglo or minority voters, and the ballot measure was soundly defeated. In the recall election, however, racial issues seemed to play a prominent role among all Californians.

More importantly, the recall election provided another indication that race will likely continue to play a significant and increasing role in California politics. The office-holding gains by minorities in labor organizations and elected office, as well as the involvement of Native American casinos through campaign contributions, will keep issues of race and ethnic minorities in the public eye for years to come. As the face of the electorate continues to change, and their partisan preferences evolve, both parties are likely to make race/ethnicity/immigration one of the key considerations as they seek to consolidate their electoral coalition. Depending on the political outcomes, California's handling of race in state politics may then be emulated by states facing similar demographic trends in years to come.

BIBLIOGRAPHY


NOTES

1. In contrast, in 1996, Republican Congressmen Robert Dornan and David Camp argued that hundreds of immigrant voters in Santa Ana were illegal aliens and broke election laws in going to the polls and voting against him. Although an independent study after the election found no basis for his claim, he continued to campaign against immigrant issues in his 1998 effort to regain the seat he lost in 1996 to Loretta Sanchez.

2. Proponents of Proposition 68 (Card Clubs and Race Tracks) in the 2004 general election have capitalized on this message by reiterating the message that Native American tribes do not pay a fair share on their Web site: "We agree with Governor Schwarzenegger: We agree that it makes zero sense for an $8 billion industry to operate in California while paying virtually nothing to support the common good. It's time for these immensely profitable Indian casinos to give something back to the state that's given them the most lucrative gaming monopoly in the nation. It's time for the people of California to get their fair share!" (emphasis in original text).

3. The survey was designed and implemented by a partnership of four organizations: the Institute for Justice and Journalism, Pew Hispanic Center, New California Media, and Tomás Rivera Policy Institute. The survey contacted 1608 registered voters between September 6–16, 2003.

4. For Figures 7.1–7.4, each dot represents a precinct in Los Angeles. The horizontal axis (x) indicates the racial composition of the precinct and the vertical axis (y) indicates the percent of the precinct that voted no on the recall referendum. The regression lines represent the predicted vote value for each point along the recall spectrum, given the distribution of the existing data.

5. While the regression line for Latinos and Bustamante vote patterns just below 60 percent support for the lieutenant governor among Latinos, the actual precinct data show that these heavily Latino precincts exceeded the regression predictions similarly to the recall vote, note that most of the data points for heavily Latino precincts are actually above the regression line.