

For a more detailed explanation of the National Annenberg Election Survey, see Daniel Romer, Kate Kenski, Kenneth Winneg, Christopher Adasiewicz, and Kathleen Hall Jamieson, *Capturing Campaign Dynamics 2000 & 2004* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2006).

Fiorina, *Culture War?*; Legee and Mueller, "How Catholic Is the Catholic Vote?"

The three-point party identification scale is utilized in this model.

A separate model was run using a dummy variable indicating Catholic status without reference to religious attendance. It produced substantively similar results. In this model the predicted probability that Catholics would identify with the Democratic Party was .372 versus .320 for non-Catholics, a difference of only 5.2 percent.

Fiorina, *Culture War?*; Layman, *Great Divide*.

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POLITICS Y LA IGLESIA

Attitudes toward the Role of Religion in Politics among Latino Catholics

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THE U.S. CONSTITUTION prohibits government from establishing or promoting a particular religion or intruding on citizens' religious beliefs or activities. Although the constitutional wall separating church and state was designed to keep religious conflicts and influences at bay, the American political and legal landscape is not free from religious strife and influences. Politicians frequently appeal to voters' religious sentiments through symbolic gestures or by supporting policies particular to religiously oriented persons. Religious leaders are increasingly active in the political arena through voter mobilization efforts and endorsements of particular candidates. Perhaps none has had the longevity or been as influential as the Christian Right. The election of a Republican majority to Congress in the mid-1990s and the presidential victories of George W. Bush, a deeply religious Christian, both with strong backing from conservative Christians and their organizations, have renewed interest among scholars in examining the role of religion in American politics.¹

Scholars have largely considered the impact of religious orientations in structuring a wide range of political attitudes among voters and in determining electoral outcomes.² More specifically, the beliefs held by evangelical Protestants are regarded as a significant force driving many contemporary political cleavages, or the so-called God gap.³ The influence of religious fundamentalist beliefs is most pronounced when it comes to policy issues with religious or moral underpinnings such as abortion, gay marriage, embryonic stem cell research, and school prayer.⁴ Measures of religious fundamentalism also correlate strongly with support for the Republican Party and

politically conservative candidates.⁵ Polls in the 2004 presidential election showed that 22 percent of voters, many of them religious conservatives, ranked "values" as the most important motivator in casting their vote, and about 80 percent of those voters supported Bush.⁶ Conservative evangelicals are a crucial constituency group for the Republican Party, and they played a crucial role in George W. Bush's margin of victory over John Kerry in 2004.

The resurgence of conservative evangelicals and other conservative Christians in politics coincides with the fourth wave of mass immigration and the growth of the Latino population. According to census estimates, at over forty million, Latinos are now the largest minority group in the nation and are the fastest-growing segment of the electorate, growing from 2.4 million voters in 1980 to 7.5 million in 2004.⁷ Recent reports noting the dramatic growth of the Hispanic electorate in states with large numbers of electoral votes and statements that the Hispanic vote is "up for grabs" have raised their political capital.⁸ Against the backdrop of a closely divided national electorate, it is little wonder that they have been the focus of intense campaign efforts by both political parties, which have spent record amounts in their efforts to woo Latinos to their ranks.

Exit polls placed the Latino vote for John Kerry at almost 68 percent, while President Bush garnered 31 percent. These numbers suggest that Latinos' traditional Democratic moorings have not wavered. Yet while most Latinos have long been aligned with the Democratic Party, pundits and journalists have argued that Republicans are beginning to make significant inroads by appealing to their religious values. This makes strategic sense, since Hispanics hold conservative attitudes on a number of social issues, and these attitudes are reinforced by the growth of evangelical groups and fundamentalist beliefs in Hispanic communities.⁹ Despite the fact that Latinos are becoming an influential voice in American politics and are deeply religious, little research has been undertaken to examine the interplay between their religious beliefs and political behavior.¹⁰ Hence, in order to gain a better understanding of political and religious change in America, it is essential to analyze the affiliation and religious beliefs of the Latino population.

This chapter is intended to fill a critical gap in the literature on religion and politics by examining the politicoreligious beliefs of Latinos. The study draws on a unique data source: the Hispanic Churches in American Public Life (HCAPL) 2000 public opinion survey. The HCAPL is based on a national telephone survey with 2,310 Latinos carried out between August 21 and October 31, 2000, in Los Angeles; San Antonio; Houston; Chicago; Miami; New York; rural Colorado; rural Iowa; and San Juan, Puerto Rico. (The analysis excludes the sample drawn from Puerto Rico, leaving a total of 2,060 respondents.) Presently, it is the largest national bilingual survey of Latino religious practices and beliefs in the United States.¹¹

Our primary interest is to explore Latino attitudes toward the role of religious leaders and organizations in politics. Among Latinos, nearly 70 percent are practicing Catholics, and we probe whether Latino Catholics view their local church as playing an active role in politics and, further, whether they support church attention to political issues.

PUBLIC OPINION TOWARD CHURCH AND STATE

The growing involvement of religious groups in American politics and public controversies over the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the Constitution have led public opinion scholars to examine mass attitudes toward the role of religion in politics and other public spheres. Some of the earliest works focused on the issue of religion in public schools, in particular school prayer and Bible reading. Despite U.S. Supreme Court decisions striking down these practices, the American public, by large margins, has favored returning prayer and Bible reading to the schoolhouse.¹² The 1980 American National Election Study found that 72.1 percent of respondents believed that schools should be allowed to start each day with a prayer. More recent studies find similar results, highlighting the stability of these beliefs despite the growth in religious diversity.¹³ Within these studies, support for religion in public schools was highest among older individuals, persons with lower levels of education, and self-identified conservatives. Beyond these sociodemographic and ideological characteristics, evangelical Protestants and varying measures of religiosity and religious orthodoxy correlated strongly with support for religious expressions in the public schools.¹⁴

Other scholars have gone beyond church-state controversies in the public schools to examine attitudes toward abstract principles surrounding the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses and concrete issues such as the display of religious symbols in public spaces and the involvement of religious groups in politics.¹⁵ Differences between elites and the mass public are noted in attitudes toward abstract principles, but smaller differences are observed when it comes to concrete issues such as the public display of Christian symbols or extending religious freedoms to religious groups that are perceived to be dangerous.¹⁶

Beyond issues surrounding the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the Constitution, much has been written on the impact of religious views on voter preferences.¹⁷ Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg explore the emergence of a new partisan cleavage pitting evangelicals, who closely identify with the Republican Party, against religiously moderate groups, which are supportive of the Democratic Party.¹⁸ Their study and others note that evangelically oriented Christians and evangelically oriented Catholics vote more heavily for the Republican Party and conservative candidates than other individuals professing a different religious identity.¹⁹ In addition, evangelicals exhibit higher rates of voter turnout and are more involved in persuading others how to vote.²⁰ In fact, the politicization of religious beliefs is often credited for the many victories of the Republican Party since the 1980s.²¹

The most consistent finding of the studies previously reviewed is that doctrinally conservative Christians, typically labeled evangelicals, fundamentalists, or born again Christians, tend to favor less separation between church and state on a wide range of issues, including the involvement of religion in politics.²² These results have led Michael R. Welch and David C. LEE to argue that "the effects of religion on politics are best measured when one moves beyond manifest characteristics such as affiliation and church attendance to other religious values and behavior."²³ In other words, fundamentalist beliefs are not confined to traditionally fundamentalist

churches and are increasingly adopted by mainline Protestants and Catholics.²⁴ How prevalent are fundamentalist beliefs among Latino Catholics and what, if any, effect do their religious beliefs and practices have on their political attitudes? Despite the sizable growth in the Latino population as well as the Latino vote, little research has examined the potentially political role played by Catholicism. In the next section, we review the findings of the HCAPL survey.

LATINO POLITICORELIGIOUS BELIEFS

Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with four statements pertaining to the involvement of religious leaders in U.S. politics and the experiences at their own churches. Table 7.1 shows the percentage of Latino Catholic respondents who "agreed somewhat" and "agreed strongly" with each of the four statements.

From the data we note that a solid majority of Latino Catholics endorse the idea of religious leaders encouraging followers to be active in their communities. Sixty percent of respondents agreed that they would like to see their church more involved in social, educational, and political issues. However, when the question turns to religious leaders attempting to exert influence in public affairs instead of the more general and less political categories of "social, educational, or political" issues, support amongst Catholics is less enthusiastic, though still noteworthy at 48 percent. The support for these activities among Latinos should not be surprising as the Catholic Church has been socially engaged in Hispanic communities since the 1960s.²⁵ The differences between the answers in the first two questions may also illustrate a divide on involvement in social issues as defined by the traditional culture war issues versus issues pertaining to social justice and community betterment. Where the first question implies a more benign involvement with community assistance as its main objective and receives stronger support, the second question brings to mind an individual advocating for a cause or consulting political leaders. Or, with the focus on religious leaders in general, some respondents may have envisioned non-Catholic religious leaders influencing public affairs and stated that they disagreed. With respect to activities within

the Church, 39 percent stated that priests or other leaders regularly discussed political issues of the day. However, only 22 percent of Latino Catholics report that they were asked to become involved in such issues by their church. While the church can be one important place of political socialization and a source of mobilization, Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady note that the Catholic Church is not quite as adept at mobilization as Protestant and evangelical churches, citing the Church's more hierarchical structure.²⁶

As a follow-up to the questions reported in table 7.1, we asked respondents what sorts of political activities their churches had engaged in over the past few years. Table 7.2 reports the results of political activity among Catholic churches. The most frequent political activity was voter registration drives, reported by 22 percent of our respondents. In contrast to the higher percentages in table 7.1, we found that only 8 percent of Latino Catholics were asked to support a specific candidate in an upcoming election, and only 9 percent stated their church had organized a political rally. However, it should be noted that six years after our survey was in the field, the Catholic Church became heavily involved in the single largest Latino political rally ever, the immigration protest rallies in March, April, and May of 2006.

In general, the initial results in table 7.1 show a strong desire on the part of Latino Catholics to have a church that is socially, and to some extent politically, active. Support for political involvement is rather high considering that the Catholic Church within the Mexican American community is noted for its political passivity in electoral politics.²⁷ What are the sources of support for a politically active church among Latino Catholics? Given the diversity of religious practices and beliefs among Catholics, it is clear that attitudinal differences are not only going to be driven by differences in respondents' sociodemographic or ideological characteristics, but also by differences in religious beliefs and practices and the religious context.²⁸ In particular, Latino Catholics have often been characterized as a highly religious group.²⁹ In table 7.3 we detail the degree of religiosity among Latino Catholics in our sample. Almost half of the sample stated that religion provides a great deal of guidance in their daily life, with an additional 22 percent saying religion provides quite a bit of guidance. Overall, 69 percent of Latino Catholics could be described as quite religious in the

TABLE 7.1 Latinos and Church Activity in Political Issues

	AGREE (%)
Would you like your church to become more involved than it is now with social, educational, or political issues?	60
Religious leaders should try to influence public affairs.	48
How often do the leaders at your local church or place of worship talk about the pressing social or political issues of the day?	39
During the past two years, have you been asked by your church or religious organization to engage in activities on behalf of specific social, educational, or political issues?	22

TABLE 7.2 Political Activities of Church in Last Five Years

	AGREE (%)
Voter registration	22
Rides to polling places	14
Distributing campaign materials	10
Advocating for ballot issue, proposition, or referendum	12
Asked people to support specific candidates	8
Organized/participated in political protest or rally	9
Church has done at least one of these activities	39

	AGREE (%)
Religion provides a great deal of guidance in daily life	47
Religion provides quite a bit of guidance in daily life	22
Attend mass every week	48
Attend mass once or twice a month	20
Read Bible weekly (outside of Mass)	23
Never read Bible (outside of Mass)	28
Attended religious school as child	31
Are faith and morals relevant to vote choice?	70

sense that religion is more than a weekly appointment, but rather plays a significant role in their daily lives. Furthermore, almost the same percent (68 percent) attend mass regularly, including half who go to church every week. Finally, we found that 70 percent of Latino Catholics stated that "faith and morals" are important to how they vote and whom they vote for.

To provide a more definitive picture of the connection between religion and politics, we turn to multivariate analysis to consider the differential impact of selected factors on Latino Catholic attitudes. We draw on the unique HCAPL public opinion survey of Latino adults.³⁰

DATA, METHODS, AND RESULTS

The HCAPL survey of Latino adults was conducted in the fall of 2000, cosponsored by the Alianza de Ministerios Evangelicos Nacionales (AMEN), the Mexican American Cultural Center (MACC), and the Tomás Rivera Policy Institute (TRPI). The survey was implemented using random digit dial in high-density Latino areas and from directory-listed households with Spanish surnames in low-density Latino areas. The survey was carried out in Los Angeles; San Antonio; Houston; Chicago; Miami; New York City; rural Colorado; rural Iowa; and San Juan, Puerto Rico (although the San Juan sample is excluded from this chapter). The design also included an oversample of 351 Protestants. In addition to the telephone survey, the overall project also included a national leadership mailout survey of 436 Latino political, civic, and religious leaders and community profiles of 268 religious and lay leaders attending 45 congregations representing 25 religious traditions in 8 urban and rural areas across the United States.³¹

Our interest is in understanding the factors underlying Latino Catholic attitudes toward religious involvement in politics (table 7.1). The first two questions reported in table 7.1 will serve as our dependent variables as we examine the social and demographic predictors of support for a politically active church (see table 7.4). Because

the responses are coded dichotomously (agree-disagree), we ran logistical regression analyses for both models and report changes in predicted probability (in addition to coefficients). From the survey, we are able to construct fourteen predictors for our multivariate analyses. These predictors can be grouped into three broad categories: religious expressions and beliefs, religious context, and sociodemographic and ideological characteristics.

Under religious expressions and beliefs, the variables selected measure religious salience and evangelicalism.³² The first variable, labeled *Religiosity*, is based on three questions measuring the frequency of prayer, reading the Bible, and attending religious services. Responses range from 0 "never" to 5 "everyday." The three questions are combined to create a religiosity scale ranging from 0 to 15. The second variable, *Guidance*, is based on a common measure asking the individual how much guidance religion provides in their daily life. The variable is categorical and ranges from none (1) to a great deal (4). As reported in table 7.3 among the respondents, 47 percent of Latino Catholics said religion provides a great deal of guidance in their day-to-day living. Increasingly, many Catholics are embracing practices long associated with evangelically oriented Protestants, as well as with the mystical side of religion known as *espiritismo*.³³ These include having a born-again experience, forming Bible study groups, proselytizing, performing faith healing, believing in *curanderismo* and *brujeria*, and speaking in tongues. Two questions capture evangelical and *espiritismo* orientations among Catholics. The first is whether they consider themselves to be born again or to have had a conversion experience related to Jesus Christ, and the second is whether they believe in practices such as *espiritismo*, *curanderismo*, and *brujeria*. Twenty-eight percent of Latino Catholics identified as "born-again" and 17 percent claim to believe in *espiritismo*-oriented theology. The hypothesis is that the variables falling under religious expressions and beliefs will be positively related to supporting greater religious involvement in politics. Evangelically oriented Catholics and Catholics with a deep sense of religiosity possess beliefs and practices similar to evangelical Protestants, the latter being strong supporters of religion's participation in politics.³⁴ *Espiritismo*-oriented Catholics may have a more mystical sense of religiosity and perhaps are less likely to embrace the convergence of religion with politics.

Kenneth D. Wald, Lyman A. Kellstedt, and Legee write that "the ties between religion and political behavior are to some degree the product of what goes on in the churches that Americans join and support so abundantly."³⁵ Churches can provide the means, motive, and opportunity for members to become politically informed and mobilized. The clergy frequently use the pulpit to transmit overt and symbolic political messages.³⁶ While most Americans do not identify the church or clergy as influential sources of political mobilization, there is evidence noting that the clergy can mobilize members around moral and family issues.³⁷ Given the central role of churches in the lives of most Americans, we argue that individuals who hear political messages or are encouraged to participate in politics will display more favorable attitudes toward religion's involvement in politics. Two variables are used to measure the religious context: *Political Information* and *Encouraged to Participate*. The first is based on a question asking, "How often do religious leaders at your local church or place of worship talk about the pressing social or political issues of the day?" The second variable

comes from a question asking, "During the past two years, have you ever been asked by your church or religious organization, or one of its leaders to engage in activities on behalf of specific social, educational, or political issues, such as calling or writing to public officials, coming to a meeting, or signing a petition?" Both are coded dichotomously, with 1 for "yes" responses. As we reported in table 7.1, among our respondents, 39 percent said political issues were discussed at their place of worship and 22 percent were encouraged to participate. These variables are important because they will help understand whether activities by the Catholic Church can further politicize the religious experience for Latinos.

Finally, the models include sociodemographic and ideological variables as controls. While a cross section of the American public claims evangelical orientations, the salience of religion is stronger among older individuals, women, and persons with lower incomes and less formal education.³⁸ The effects of sociodemographic characteristics vary depending on the particular issue surrounding the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses in the Constitution.³⁹ For example, when it comes to abstract principles surrounding the separation of church and state, individuals with higher levels of education and income favored greater separation than lower socioeconomic status persons. Women were less likely than men to hold separationist attitudes. Finally, self-identified political conservatives favored a greater presence of religion in politics.⁴⁰ On concrete issues, such as the display of religious symbols in public or school prayer, the effects of sociodemographics were less consistent. Nonetheless, political conservatives were consistently more likely to favor religious displays, school prayer, and public funding of religious schools.

The models control for age, income, education, marital status, gender (female), nativity, national origin (Mexican), and political ideology (Republican). While having some expectation regarding the direction of the coefficients, we are agnostic as to the effects of these controls on Latino attitudes, as all of the previous research is based on samples with non-Hispanic whites. This agnosticism is also founded on recent scholarship showing that the traditional sociodemographic predictors of political participation and attitudes do not neatly apply to Latinos and other ethnic or racial minorities.⁴¹ However, we have some expectations regarding the effects of political ideology, given the strong connection between conservatives, the Republican Party, and religious sentiments. Thus, it is expected that self-identified Latino Republicans will be stronger supporters of religion's participation in politics than non-Republicans.

In table 7.4, two columns of results are presented for both of our models. The first reports the logistic coefficients with the standard errors in parentheses, while the second set of results reports changes in the predicted probability that the dependent variable will take on a value of one, given a fixed change in the independent variable from its minimum to its maximum value, holding all others constant at their mean.⁴²

Among the religious expression variables, only religiosity has a statistically significant effect on attitudes towards the convergence of religion and politics. Latino Catholics who attend mass and pray more frequently and read the Bible are much more likely to support their church being more involved in political issues, as well as to support religious leaders having influence in public affairs. Thus, Latino Catholics who are

TABLE 7.4 Determinants of Support for Religious Involvement in Politics among Latino Catholics

	Model 1 Church More Involved		Model 2 Influence Public Affairs	
	COEFFICIENTS	MIN-MAX	COEFFICIENTS	MIN-MAX
RELIGIOUS EXPRESSIONS				
<i>Religiosity</i>	0.074 [†] (0.023)	0.211	0.048** (0.022)	0.145
<i>Guidance</i>	0.060 (0.063)	0.059	0.093 (0.062)	0.091
<i>Born Again</i>	0.168 (0.149)	0.040	0.178 (0.142)	0.045
<i>Espiritismo</i>	-0.211 (0.167)	-0.051	0.106 (0.163)	0.026
RELIGIOUS CONTEXT				
<i>Political Information</i>	0.166*** (0.064)	0.118	0.269 [†] (0.062)	0.199
<i>Encouraged to Participate</i>	0.830 [†] (0.179)	0.186	0.467*** (0.160)	0.116
SOCIODEMOGRAPHICS AND IDEOLOGICAL CHARACTERISTICS				
<i>Age</i>	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.163	-0.013*** (0.004)	-0.218
<i>Education</i>	-0.082* (0.047)	-0.099	-0.016 (0.046)	-0.019
<i>Income</i>	-0.616*** (0.256)	-0.152	-0.612** (0.257)	-0.147
<i>Married</i>	-0.163 (0.130)	-0.039	-0.115 (0.127)	-0.029
<i>Female</i>	0.057 (0.131)	0.014	-0.002 (0.128)	-0.001
<i>U.S. Born</i>	-0.495 [†] (0.140)	-0.120	-0.020 (0.136)	-0.005
<i>Mexican Origin</i>	0.314** (0.135)	0.076	-0.182 (0.132)	-0.045
<i>Republican</i>	-0.021 (0.199)	-0.005	0.080 (0.196)	-0.020
Constant	-0.130 (0.347)		-0.779** (0.341)	
PPC	63.8%		59.9%	
PRE	0.124		0.152	
Sample Size	1,171		1,171	
Significance levels: * p <= .100, ** p <= .05, *** p <= .01, † p <= .001, one-tailed.				

st religious would like to see religion injected into the political sphere. Interestere was no difference in how born-again Catholics, *espiritismo* Catholics, and nal Catholics viewed the connection between religion and politics.

he data strongly suggest that the political context (*Political Information and ged to Participate*) exerts a significant effect across both models. Receiving l information, or being asked to get involved in politics through the Church, atinos Catholics wanting even more. The effects for political information were n both models, with Latinos about 12 percent more likely to support more l involvement from their church and 20 percent more likely to support reli- aders influencing public affairs if their church talked about social and polit- es of the day. When the Catholic Church encourages Latinos to get involved cal issues, they likewise support additional involvement in political affairs hurch and by religious leaders. In short, belonging to a politically active eads followers to develop a positive outlook toward religion's involvement cs.

re effects of the sociodemographic variables also yielded interesting patterns. id more educated and higher-income individuals were less supportive of the r religious leaders taking a role in political affairs. Perhaps older individuals ore traditional view of the Catholic Church as an apolitical institution, given rically passive role of the Catholic Church in politics. Because education is ave a politically liberalizing effect, it may be the case that Latinos with higher education are skeptical of a politically active church, since its involvement ely be equated with support for conservative candidates.⁴³ With respect to ch involvement in politics (model I), we find that U.S.-born Latinos are less be supportive than foreign born, and that Latinos of Mexican origin are ly to be supportive.

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als and Latinos are increasingly becoming influential actors in American pol- le the nexus between these two groups has yet to be fully explored by social , it is increasingly evident that the future political success of the Christian ends on its ability to recruit emerging minority groups such as Latinos. This t is noted by John C. Green, Mark Rozell, and Clyde Wilcox, who write that iversity presented both a challenge and a largely untapped opportunity for ment. . . . Hispanic Catholics shared many of the religious values of the move- re supporters but rarely backed movement organizations . . . few [Hispanic] joined the movement in backing Republican candidates."⁴⁴

s well-known that Latinos are deeply religious and hold many values, be- political attitudes similar to those of evangelical Christians. For example, vey analyzed here, 60 percent of Latino Catholics supported the teaching on and creationism side by side, while an additional 20 percent think only m should be taught in biology class. Furthermore, the survey found that t are strongly opposed to abortion and 62 percent are opposed to homo-

sexuality. All three of these religious-influenced issues are topical political issues to- day as well. It also finds a strong desire among Latinos for a politically active Catholic Church. However, within Hispanic communities the Catholic Church has historically been reluctant to promote participation in electoral politics. In the survey only a small percentage of respondents reported being politically mobilized by their church. Only 10 percent stated that their church distributed campaign materials, and 8 percent asked parishioners to support a specific candidate. These findings then paint a pes- simistic picture regarding the role of the Catholic Church in mobilizing Latino vot- ers and may present an opportunity for recruitment by evangelicals seeking to make inroads into the Hispanic community. This, of course, presumes that Latino evan- gelical groups are more likely to mobilize Latinos politically. Would evangelical churches spur Latino political participation and foster beliefs favoring greater ties between religion and politics?

In their classic work on political participation, Verba, Scholzman, and Brady found Latino Catholics to be less politically engaged than Latino Protestants, while the latter were as engaged as Anglo Protestants.⁴⁵ Verba, Scholzman, and Brady con- cluded that the Catholic Church was a politically demobilizing institution. Jongho Lee, Harry Pachon, and Matt Barreto found that being Catholic per se did not lead to lower political involvement among Latinos.⁴⁶ Instead, the Catholic Church tended to offer Latinos less opportunities to become politically engaged within the church. However, Latino Catholics who were politicized at church were as likely as any other denomi- nation to be politically active outside the Church.

Gastón Espinosa has sought to challenge the belief that Hispanic Catholics are more politically disengaged than other groups.⁴⁷ Drawing on the same data analyzed here, Espinosa finds evidence that the Catholic Church can be a source of political mo- bilization. Yet he also confirms the findings by Verba, Scholzman, and Brady by noting that "Latino Protestants are more proactive than Catholics in most forms of political and social action."⁴⁸ While Latino Protestants claimed higher levels of religious-based mobilization than Latino Catholics in the HCAPL survey, the differences were for the most part negligible, suggesting that under multivariate scrutiny, those differences might wash out when controlling for other factors beyond denominational affiliation. This is precisely what Michael Jones-Correa and David L. Leal found using data from the Latino National Political Survey. When differences were observed between Latino Catholics and Protestants, it was the former who participated at higher rates.⁴⁹ In short, the differences in Latino civic engagement and politicoreligious attitudes may not be as stark across denominational affiliations as previously believed.

Taking our results as a whole, it appears that high levels of Latino politicoreli- gious mobilization by Catholics has yet to occur. Nonetheless, there is a relatively strong interest on the part of Latino Catholics to have politically engaged churches. We believe Latino parishioners on the whole will be responsive to any religious group seeking their recruitment and political mobilization. Whether Latino religious politi- cization is undertaken by the Catholic Church or Protestant churches, evangelical or mainline, remains to be seen. What is clear is that the political influence of any reli- gious group will be significantly enhanced by the presence of large numbers of politi- cally engaged Latinos.

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