Somos Más: How Racial Threat and Anger Mobilized Latino Voters in the Trump Era

Angela Gutierrez1, Angela X. Ocampo2, Matt A. Barreto1, and Gary Segura1

Abstract
While evidence from California suggests that group threat mobilizes Latinos, nationally, there has never been a test case for this theory. In 2016, the Trump campaign provided a clear case of group threat through his divisive rhetoric and policy proposals targeting Mexican Americans and immigrants. Using the 2016 Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) data, we find evidence that Latino voters were politically motivated by Trump’s anti-Latino rhetoric. We hypothesize that Latino voters who perceive Latinos as a racialized group and feel a sense of immigrant-linked fate are more likely to hold negative views toward the Republican candidate, and feel angry during the 2016 election. We further find that Latino voters who were angry were more likely to engage in political activities such as donating to campaigns, contacting government officials, and protesting during and shortly after the 2016 election. The findings hold for U.S. born Latinos as well as among non-Mexican Latinos who felt similarly targeted by Trump’s rhetoric and proposals.

Keywords
Latino, threat, identity, anger

Introduction
While evidence from California seems to confirm the hypothesis that group threat mobilizes Latinos, nationally, there has never been a test case for this theory. Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura’s (2001) article, “Citizens by Choice, Voters by Necessity” points to mobilization effects in California as a response to state-level political threat as compared with Texas and Florida. Other works have documented the anti-immigrant climate in California1 and suggested political mobilizing effects. However, nearly every study on group threat and mobilization since Pantoja et al. (2001) has focused on California (e.g., Bowler, Nicholson, and Segura 2006), or has only found strong effects in California (Ramirez 2013). Furthermore, recent research argues that Latinos in California were predisposed to support the Democratic Party, and the increase in Democratic partisanship and mobilization of the nineties were not necessarily the result of group-based threat, raising concerns that there was no mobilizing effect (Hui and Sears 2018). In this paper, we seek to test whether anti-immigrant threat is felt at a national level by Latinos of different origins, and generations, and if threat mobilizes beyond the specific context of California.

In 2016, Donald Trump’s campaign provided a clear case of group threat through his divisive rhetoric and policy proposals. We argue that beyond California, and beyond Mexican Americans, the Trump campaign increased the saliency of a racialized Latino identity. Many Latinos viewed his campaign as a panethnic attack on all Latinos in the United States. While Mexican Americans were the target of much of Trump’s rhetoric, we believe other Latinos with a sense of racialized Latino identity and immigrant-linked fate also viewed Trump’s remarks and campaign as a threat and were angered by his rhetoric. Using data from 2016, our findings suggest that U.S.-born Latinos as well as non-Mexican Latinos with heightened immigrant-linked fate and racialized identity felt similarly targeted by Trump’s rhetoric and proposals, which, in turn, resulted in lower support for the Republican candidate.

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During a 2016 focus group in Florida with Puerto Rican registered voters, a moderator asked the 10 participants to describe Donald Trump. Half of the respondents said “racist.” They were asked, “Why do you think he is racist?” The participants offered some variation of “he wants to deport all Mexicans.” The moderator then followed-up, “Do you think he is only talking about Mexicans then or all Latinos?” Without hesitation, all participants responded that Trump is referring to all Latinos, to all immigrants. They surmised he was using Mexicans as an example because they are largest in size, and because of the southern border, but he was not racist against just Mexicans, but all Latinos, including Puerto Ricans.

Two days later, the same moderator interviewed 10 Republican Cuban American voters in Florida. The moderator followed a similar script as with the Puerto Rican voters, and a nearly identical discussion followed. When asked if Trump liked Cubans more than Mexicans, one participant said, “He is against all Latin immigrants. He thinks we are all Mexicans anyway, if you have an accent, if you have brown skin, then you are a criminal, or a rapist and Trump wants to deport you.” In the focus group of conservative Cuban Americans, all agreed that Trump’s rhetoric was offensive to all Latinos, not just Mexican Americans.

What explains this anecdotal evidence of Latino immigrant-linked fate and panethnic solidarity? By recognizing that Trump’s xenophobic rhetoric is meant to typcast all Latinos and immigrants as individuals who burden the United States rather than enhance it, Latinos of all nationalities are able to look past intragroup differences in an attempt to eliminate a common threat. In this paper, we lay out a theory of group solidarity and immigrant-linked fate that argues that Trump made feelings of discrimination and linked fate salient among all group members. Many in the group whose sense of immigrant-linked fate and racialized identity were made salient in the 2016 election were more likely to dislike the Republican candidate, and feel angry during the 2016 election. While immigrant-linked fate and racialized identity may manifest separately, we think it is also probable that many people have a high sense of both. Whether together or independent, we expect Latinos who hold a strong sense of immigrant-linked fate or racialized identity, or more likely, a combination of the two will be angered by the 2016 election. We hypothesize that this anger lead to greater political participation among Latinos in the United States.

**Racialized Panethnicity: A Politicized Identity**

While the majority of Latinos are classified racially as white, the ethnic category of Latino/Hispanic was adopted by the U.S. government in 1970 as a way to distinguish people of Latin American origin (Mora 2014). Scholars have long debated the appropriateness of panethnic identifiers to categorize such a diverse group, arguing in some instances that they will be able to assimilate into whiteness and in other instances that the group itself is too diverse for the panethnic term to hold meaning (Beltran 2010; Citrin and Sears 2014; Perlmann 2005). Whether or not people ascribe to panethnic identities is a valid question given that, racially, they are classified as white and may more strongly identify with their national origin. This issue is exacerbated when we consider intragroup discrimination on the basis of national origin and assimilation in the United States (Lavariega Monforti, and Sanchez 2010). We argue that the racialization of Latinos in the United States will serve to increase the salience and significance of a panethnic identity in the United States.

Panethnic identifiers are more commonly used in the United States than other Latin American countries, so while a person may readily identify as Mexican American or Cuban American, their affinity toward Latino identity may be tempered. However, for those who identify as Latino, when faced with group stigmatization, there are many ways in which they may seek to mitigate the negative effects. Social identity theory, for instance, argues that individuals aim to hold a positive self-image, but when they feel that their identity is in a disadvantaged or inferior position, they may engage in behavior to improve their status and position (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Social identity theory finds that there are many identity-management tools that individuals may try in order to feel better about their status (Mummendey et al. 1999). These strategies may take the form of individual mobility, such as leaving the ingroup to join the outgroup; recategorization, which operates by adopting a higher status identity like American; social competition, in the form of seeking to achieve a higher status for your group or reverse the dominance roles; and realistic competition, which manifests by trying to gain more material resources than the outgroup (Blanz et al. 1998; Mummendey et al. 1999). We argue that individuals who believe Latinos have been racialized and discriminated against or hold high levels of immigrant-linked fate are likely to engage in social competition, a form of collective group behavior motivated to increase the social standing of the group (Blanz et al. 1998).

A common thread throughout the history of Latin Americans in the United States is the discrimination that many have faced. Whether discussing urban renewal projects in New York City, which purged a large portion of the Puerto Rican community from the area, or English-only efforts in Dade County, Florida aimed at the growing Cuban American population, or school segregation and disenfranchisement of Mexican Americans in the Southwest, a common experience among these Latino
ethnic groups is their marginalized status (Arington 1990; Ortiz and Telles 2012; Padilla 1985; Sánchez 2007). Due to a long history of racial inequality and discrimination, scholars have found that the racialization of Mexican Americans and other national origin groups does not end after initial migration and assimilation but spans generations (Rumbaut 2009; Telles and Ortiz 2008). Thus, while the panethnic nomenclature may be uniquely American, newer immigrants from Latin America and U.S.-born Latinos recognize that they too share in the marginalized status of Latinos in the United States (Portes and Bach 1985; Valdez 2015). As expressed by respondents in the focus groups, Latinos in the United States have come to understand that the broader American society largely does not view Latin American countries distinctly and that discrimination is likely to occur no matter the country of origin. We hypothesize that because of this racialized identity, Latinos are more likely to view themselves as similar in status and members of the same panethnic group.

How respondents view and interpret their identity is important to understanding how Latinos responded to the rhetoric in the 2016 election. Rooted in social identity theory, García-Ríos, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) argue that individuals contain a portfolio of multiple identities that can be used in the political decision-making process. Social identities that are more salient are more important to individuals and easily politicized via hostile rhetoric than less salient identities (Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje 2002; Pérez 2015a; Tajfel and Turner 1979). They find that for Mexican Americans, national origin identity was made salient because of Trump’s rhetoric. The basis for this theory rests on the idea that Mexican Americans with a positive group identity will engage in positive reinforcing identity management techniques when the group is impugned (García-Ríos, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta 2018). However, an identity that García-Ríos, Pedraza, and Wilcox-Archuleta (2018) do not consider is a racialized panethnic identity. Similar to national origin group identity, Latinos may hear Trump’s rhetoric and respond to the xenophobic attack not as a Mexican American or a Cuban American, but as a racialized Latino/Hispanic.

We do not deny that Latinos identify with their national origin group, but we believe that panethnic identity, which has been racialized by U.S. society, can be made just as salient. When respondents in the Collaborative Multi-Racial Post-Election Survey (CMPS) were asked how much is being Latino/Hispanic an important part of how they see themselves, 55 percent of respondents said it was very important with an additional 32 percent stating that it was somewhat important. Only 13 percent of all respondents claimed being Latino was not very or not at all important to how they viewed themselves. The breakdown was similar to responses for how important national origin identities were to how respondents view themselves.4

Because of the racial hierarchy in the United States, members from other groups in the hierarchy racialize Latinos into one amorphous group, which increases the benefit of rallying around Latinos when the group is attacked (Masuoka and Junn 2013; Padilla 1985; Valdez 2015). Recognizing that all Latinos face discrimination may be a way in which individuals view the successes and failures of Latinos broadly as successes and failures for their national origin groups as well (Roccas and Brewer 2002). Research has also found that in the face of threat, intragroup differences are likely to decrease in importance and, instead, group members are likely to focus on the intergroup threat, which may increase the centrality of a racialized panethnic identity (Armenta and Hunt 2009; Brewer 1999; Huddy, Sears, and Levy 2013). Indeed, there is reason to believe that Latinos with a strong sense of immigrant-linked fate or racialized identity would be more likely to engage in positive reinforcing identity management strategies. Pérez (2015b) found that when faced with anti-immigrant statements, high identifying Latinos are less politically trusting, more ethnocentric, and more supportive of policies that exude ingroup pride, while low identifiers attempt to move away from the stigmatized identity.

By starting his presidential bid with a xenophobic attack against Mexican American immigrants and those who enter the United States via the southern border, Trump angered and provoked a much larger community in the United States. We hypothesize that Latinos who have developed a racialized panethnic identity were angered by Trump’s rhetoric and were more likely to view him unfavorably. This racialized identity is particularly important in 2016 when individuals may feel that their membership to the broader U.S. society is being questioned. Furthermore, not only are Latinos in the United States racialized by their skin color, language, and culture, but Donald Trump’s attack against immigrants particularly resonates with the Latino population because of their more recent immigrant history. Studies have argued that immigrant status has become one of the key factors in racializing immigrants (Cobas, Duany, and Feagin 2015). Immigration is a serious issue for many Latinos given that 67 percent of registered Latino voters personally know someone who is undocumented (Barreto and Segura 2014). The number of Latinos who would be affected by changes to immigration policy extends well beyond the foreign-born Mexican American population. While 35 percent of Mexican Americans are immigrant, immigrants comprise a greater percentage of other Latin American nationalities.5
We hypothesize that due to outgroup attacks, Latino identity will gain primacy not only by the most threatened national origin group but also by Latinos of all nationalities who feel a connection to this identity. To operationalize a racialized panethnic identity, we will focus on two measures, feelings of racialized discrimination toward Latinos in the United States broadly, and a new measure we call immigrant-linked fate. Because the measures for panethnic and national origin identities are so highly correlated, we opted to use the items that we believe are most likely to capture the racialized nature of panethnic identity. We argue that racialized identity and immigrant linked fate were made salient in the 2016 election, and those with high levels of immigrant-linked fate and racialized discrimination are most likely to hold an unfavorable view of the Republican candidate. We suspect that these two variables may work independently of one another, but when high levels of both are present, we may see a greater dislike for the Republican candidate. We also expect that Latinos who view Trump unfavorably are more likely to feel angry about the 2016 election and mobilize during the 2016 campaign.

**Group Threat, Group Anger**

While Trump’s rhetoric may stoke fear and anger among Latinos, the type of rhetoric espoused by Trump in the 2016 election is not new to American politics (Pedraza and Osorio 2017; Santa Ana 2017). Prior to the 2016 presidential election, there have been other opportunities to study how Latinos respond to threat. In the early 1990s in California, Latinos faced political threat with propositions 187, 209, and 227 (Hajnal and Baldassare 2001; HoSang 2010). In December of 2005, Latinos were once again faced with political threat, this time at the national level. Response to this bill was strong not only among Mexican Americans who make up the largest portion of the Latino population in the United States but also among other groups of Latin American origin. Studies on political engagement in response to these bills found that all generations were equally likely to engage in protest, while Mexican Americans and those who spoke Spanish at home were most likely to engage in protest (Barreto et al. 2009). Other studies found that the role of activists were key to mobilizing cities in the form of mass protest demonstrations (Ramirez 2013; Zepeda-Millán 2017). But few have been able to measure ways Latinos responded to political threat outside of protest. Our aim is to examine a host of different types of political participation activities to see if the response to threat goes beyond the scope of a few activities, to a broader range of political mobilization.

An important aspect to consider is that emotional responses to threatening rhetoric can play an instrumental role in motivating individuals to either engage with or disengage from the political process. Theories on emotion have hypothesized that people often respond via habit when in predictable situations, but when unexpected events arise, individuals are often alert and may respond with anger, anxiety, and fear (Marcus, Neuman, and MacKuen 2000; Neuman et al. 2007). Anger arises in response to a negative event, which is caused by a specific agent that is viewed as unjust or illegitimate, thus eliciting a different response (Huddy, Feldman, and Cassese 2007; Valentino et al. 2008). Conducting experiments on emotional cues and behavioral responses, Valentino et al. (2011) found that anger is likely to increase all forms of political participation while other emotions like fear are inconsistent in increasing political participation.

These studies shed light on how anger may have helped motivate Latinos during the 2016 election. But people respond differently to anger, and their responses can vary by different racial groups (Phoenix 2017). Phoenix (2017) finds that while blacks reported being less angry than whites in the 2016 election, anger was not associated with black voter mobilization but was correlated with white mobilization. Given Trump’s rhetoric in the 2016 election, we might expect that many Latino voters would feel angry by his comments and his racialized language toward Latinos, which would lead to an increase in political participation.

We hypothesize that Latinos who recognize the racialized structure in the United States and hold a strong sense of immigrant-linked fate will hold more unfavorable opinions about Trump. Furthermore, we expect that people who dislike Trump particularly because of his rhetoric will be angrier in the 2016 election. Those who are angry because of the anti-Latino anti-immigrant rhetoric should also be more likely to participate during the 2016 election. We expect that state context will have little bearing on Trump favorability and mobilization and anticipate that dislike for Trump and mobilization will not be limited to Mexican Americans but will be consistent across all national origin groups and generations.

**Data**

To examine our hypotheses, we rely on the 2016 CMPS. The 2016 CMPS was an online self-administered survey conducted from December 3, 2016 to February 15, 2017. The survey was available in multiple languages including both English and Spanish. Among its 10,145 respondents were 3,003 Latino respondents. The Latino sample includes both registered and nonregistered voters, thus allowing us to more thoroughly examine the impact of anti-Latino and anti-immigrant rhetoric on nonvoters and Latinos who may have engaged in other forms of...
nonelectoral participation. We rely on two key proxies to empirically examine whether respondents with racialized Latino identity and immigrant-linked fate drove negative attitudes toward Donald Trump and increased participation among Latinos.

The first item is a racism scale constructed from two questions on the CMPS. This scale is our proxy for how respondents understand racialized discrimination toward Latinos. Given the richness of the CMPS, there were many discrimination and racism variables to choose from. The first item we include is “how much of a problem do you think discrimination is in preventing Latinos in general from succeeding in America?” This is a five-item question that ranges from not a problem at all to the primary problem. The second discrimination item we include asks “how much discrimination is there in the United States today against Latinos?” This is also a five-item question that ranges from none at all to a lot. Together, these questions help us capture perceived economic and social discrimination toward Latinos in American society today. Each variable was rescaled between zero and one with zero indicating no perceived racism and one indicating the highest level of perceived racism. The two items were added, creating a scale that ranges from zero to two.9 Table 1 displays the frequencies of the racism scale by national origin group. We expect to find that Latinos across various subgroups, who express that Latinos are racially discriminated against, are the most likely to oppose Trump. We also suspect that those who perceive Latinos to be racially discriminated against are most likely to be angry during the 2016 election.

The second proxy that we rely on is immigrant-linked fate. Even though most of the 2016 campaign rhetoric targeted Latinos of Mexican origin and immigrants, Latinos of other national origins and other subgroups with high levels of immigrant identity should also regard the anti-Latino and anti-immigrant rhetoric as threatening. Subsequently, we expect that immigrant-linked fate will affect their evaluations of Trump and motivate them to participate. This is in part because Latinos share strong connections to the immigrant community, even if they are second or third generation, as many Latinos lived in mixed-status households and have immigrant and undocumented family and friends. Furthermore, the racialization of Latinos in the United States may make some Latinos feel closer to immigrants. This is the first time that this question has been asked on a survey, but given that immigration has a lot to do with the position of Latinos in the racial hierarchy, we expect that immigrant-linked fate is a strong component of a racialized Latino identity. The four-point immigrant-linked fate item captures whether or not respondents believed that what happens generally to immigrants in this country will have something to do with what happens in their life. Our two key independent variables are moderately and positively correlated10 but not so much so that we are concerned about losing statistical power.

We added a separate item to indicate respondents who believe racism and race relations were the number one issue facing their community that the President and Congress should address. We expect that those who say that racism and race relations are the number one issue to address hold the most intense views on racism and discrimination in the United States, and should be viewed as issue publics with intense opinions (Krosnick 1990). The issue public literature suggests that people who care intensely about a particular policy are most likely to hold intense views that color the way they view politics. Thus, when a racial threat is present, they should be most knowledgeable and sensitive toward a threat in their domain, making them likely to be more politically responsive than the rest of the public.

Our first model examines feelings toward the Republican candidate. Here, our dependent variable is Trump favorability. This is a four-point item that ranges from very unfavorable to highly favorable. Although a majority of respondents (64%) express holding a very unfavorable opinion of Donald Trump, and 14 percent

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Racism Scale</th>
<th>Cuban</th>
<th>Mexican</th>
<th>Puerto Ricans</th>
<th>South American</th>
<th>Central American</th>
<th>Dominican</th>
<th>Other Ethnic</th>
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<td>1.5</td>
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hold a somewhat unfavorable view, there are still a number of people who hold a favorable view of Trump. Of Latinos surveyed, 15 percent hold a somewhat favorable view while 7 percent hold a very favorable view of Donald Trump. We model how racialized Latino identity, immigrant-linked fate, generation, and partisanship are correlated with attitudes toward Donald Trump using ordered logistic regression. We also examine how these predictors were associated with attitudes toward Trump by national origin, nativity, and state context.

All of our models also include controls for partisanship, with Republicans serving as the reference category and dummy variables for Democrat and Independent respondents. The ideology measure is a five-point item that examines how liberal, moderate, or conservative respondents categorized themselves. This is coded from the most liberal (1) to the most conservative (5). We also include an internal efficacy variable, which is a five-point item that taps into individual’s perceptions that they understand political affairs.

To capture important demographic correlates, we also control for the language in which the respondent receives news. This ranges from 1, for those who receive news only in English, to 5 for those who only get information in Spanish, as well as dummy variables to account for generation, with first-generation immigrants serving as the reference category. In addition to controlling for generation, we also control for national origin with Mexican Americans as the reference category. To determine whether mobilization is widespread, we also include state dummies with California serving as the reference category. One reason to think that California may be different is the fact that they had a number of anti-immigrant propositions in the past, which has led to mobilization of Latino voters in the state (Pantoja, Ramirez, and Segura 2001; Ramirez 2013). By using California as the reference group, we hope to show that it is not just Californians who dislike Trump and are mobilized by political threat but a national response. We control for income and education, as well as age and gender of the respondent, and if the respondent is Evangelical or born-again. Frequency tables by national origin, generation, state, and education can be found in the appendix.

Our second set of models examines what is correlated with anger, and whether viewing Trump very unfavorably during the 2016 election is associated with feeling angry. Respondents were asked “during the 2016 election season, how often did you feel angry?” Responses range from never, sometimes, often, or all the time. We run our anger model as a standard logistic regression in which never and sometimes are coded zero, and often and all the time are coded one. We use anger as our dependent variable and control for the covariates previously mentioned. We expect that immigrant-linked fate and racialized discrimination, which influence Trump favorability, will also shape feeling angry during the election. By examining what is correlated with being angry in the 2016 election, we hope to provide a possible explanation as to how Trump’s rhetoric may lead to higher levels of anger, and increased participation among the Latino population.

The final portion of our analysis focuses on Latino participation in the 2016 cycle and its relationship with feeling angry in the 2016 election. The CMPS asked respondents whether or not they engaged in many different acts of political participation. Because our goal is to look at engagement in a number of different political acts, we used these separate questions to build an additive scale for political participation. Our political participation model sums up the yes responses to five political actions; working for a campaign, donating money to a campaign, being a member of a civic group, contacting a government official, and protesting. We chose these political actions because these are costlier to voters, as opposed to things like wearing a campaign button or posting on the Internet. Therefore, it is likely that only those who are really invested in the political outcome will actually engage in these activities.14 While being involved in activities outside of voting is not very common, the alpha for this scale is quite strong ($\alpha = 0.7$). Table 2 displays the percentage of respondents who reported participating in these activities.

### Results

Table 3 column 1 displays the base model for Trump favorability. The results indicate that the racism scale and immigrant-linked fate are strongly correlated with negative attitudes toward Trump. We also find that believing racism is the most important issue is correlated with disliking Trump. When compared with first-generation respondents, being a second-generation Latino is correlated with a more negative view of Trump, but third-generation Latinos appear to hold more favorable views of Trump when compared with first-generation respondents. This suggests that opposition to Trump is strongest among

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<th>Number of political acts</th>
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those closer to the immigrant experience. However, we find that fourth-generation and beyond are not distinguishable in their views of Trump when compared with first-generation Latinos, so perhaps while the third-generation respondents may be distinct in their greater levels of support for Trump, we see that later generations are no different from their immigrant counterparts.

As expected, Democrats and Independents hold less favorable views of Trump than Republicans, and being more ideologically conservative and Evangelical is correlated with holding a more positive view of Trump. Subsetting the analysis to just the Democrats in our sample and found similar results to the full sample. These results indicate that even among those who are already predisposed to dislike Trump, our racialized identity variables still play a shaping role in the political views of Latinos. Similar to Lavariega Monforti (2017), we find that Latinas are more likely to view Trump very unfavorably when compared with men. When looking at how support for Trump changes by national origin, we find that being of Central American or Cuban origin is correlated with holding a more positive view toward Trump when compared with Mexican Americans, but we find no effect among other national origin groups. This is understandable for Cubans who are known to lean Republican, but we are unsure as to why we find this correlation for Central Americans. It might be because close to 50 percent of the Central American sample was born in the United States. We further find that Trump favorability is uncorrelated with living in any particular state.

Since ordered logit coefficients are not directly interpretable, Figure 1 displays the marginal effect of going

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Trump favorability</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Anger</th>
<th>Participation</th>
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<tr>
<td>Immigrant Linked Fat</td>
<td>−0.168*** (0.033)</td>
<td>0.111*** (0.032)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Racism scale</td>
<td>−0.857*** (0.097)</td>
<td>0.798*** (0.106)</td>
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<td>Reverse Trump Favorability</td>
<td>0.497*** (0.054)</td>
<td>0.590*** (0.053)</td>
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<td>0.431*** (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feeling Angry during Election</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Racism Most Important Issue</td>
<td>−0.718*** (0.135)</td>
<td>0.301* (0.118)</td>
<td>0.432*** (0.115)</td>
<td>−0.017 (0.066)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Second generation</td>
<td>−0.298*** (0.113)</td>
<td>0.456*** (0.114)</td>
<td>0.319*** (0.111)</td>
<td>0.301*** (0.063)</td>
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<td>Third Generation</td>
<td>0.345* (0.158)</td>
<td>0.546*** (0.173)</td>
<td>0.422* (0.170)</td>
<td>0.521*** (0.088)</td>
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<td>Fourth Generation</td>
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<tr>
<td>Uses Spanish Language</td>
<td>−0.092* (0.041)</td>
<td>−0.137*** (0.042)</td>
<td>−0.092* (0.041)</td>
<td>0.128*** (0.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>−1.837*** (0.126)</td>
<td>0.091 (0.149)</td>
<td>0.199 (0.145)</td>
<td>0.065 (0.078)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Independent</td>
<td>−1.347*** (0.123)</td>
<td>−0.215 (0.149)</td>
<td>−0.230 (0.145)</td>
<td>−0.256*** (0.083)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
<td>0.246*** (0.045)</td>
<td>−0.029 (0.046)</td>
<td>−0.059 (0.044)</td>
<td>−0.195*** (0.026)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Int. Efficacy</td>
<td>0.017 (0.038)</td>
<td>−0.129*** (0.039)</td>
<td>−0.170*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.042* (0.021)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economy Worse</td>
<td>−0.189*** (0.038)</td>
<td>0.036 (0.036)</td>
<td>0.048 (0.035)</td>
<td>−0.057*** (0.020)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cuban</td>
<td>0.604*** (0.223)</td>
<td>0.154 (0.267)</td>
<td>−0.068 (0.255)</td>
<td>0.166 (0.129)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puerto Rican</td>
<td>−0.142 (0.165)</td>
<td>−0.358*** (0.163)</td>
<td>−0.478*** (0.160)</td>
<td>0.159 (0.088)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominican</td>
<td>−0.036 (0.255)</td>
<td>−0.588*** (0.268)</td>
<td>−0.822*** (0.261)</td>
<td>−0.076 (0.154)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Central American</td>
<td>0.334* (0.153)</td>
<td>−0.095 (0.161)</td>
<td>−0.242 (0.157)</td>
<td>−0.134 (0.094)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South American</td>
<td>0.215 (0.194)</td>
<td>−0.181 (0.205)</td>
<td>−0.384 (0.199)</td>
<td>0.266*** (0.100)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spanish Other</td>
<td>0.134 (0.202)</td>
<td>0.117 (0.213)</td>
<td>0.066 (0.209)</td>
<td>−0.00003 (0.117)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arizona</td>
<td>−0.256 (0.252)</td>
<td>−0.424 (0.236)</td>
<td>−0.331 (0.231)</td>
<td>−0.232 (0.143)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Texas</td>
<td>0.042 (0.123)</td>
<td>−0.064 (0.122)</td>
<td>−0.105 (0.119)</td>
<td>−0.377*** (0.076)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Florida</td>
<td>0.271 (0.175)</td>
<td>−0.147 (0.181)</td>
<td>−0.106 (0.178)</td>
<td>−0.156 (0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey and New York</td>
<td>0.117 (0.174)</td>
<td>−0.057 (0.171)</td>
<td>−0.055 (0.168)</td>
<td>−0.274*** (0.097)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other states</td>
<td>0.046 (0.117)</td>
<td>−0.135 (0.119)</td>
<td>−0.124 (0.116)</td>
<td>−0.129* (0.065)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evangelical</td>
<td>0.592*** (0.105)</td>
<td>−0.123 (0.113)</td>
<td>−0.109 (0.109)</td>
<td>0.181*** (0.062)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>−0.061 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.043 (0.040)</td>
<td>0.079* (0.039)</td>
<td>0.209*** (0.022)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income</td>
<td>−0.021 (0.017)</td>
<td>0.083*** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.077*** (0.017)</td>
<td>0.043*** (0.009)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age</td>
<td>−0.015*** (0.003)</td>
<td>−0.002 (0.003)</td>
<td>−0.005 (0.003)</td>
<td>0.003 (0.002)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>−0.396*** (0.088)</td>
<td>0.594*** (0.090)</td>
<td>0.606*** (0.087)</td>
<td>−0.283*** (0.051)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>−3.196*** (0.365)</td>
<td>−2.035*** (0.334)</td>
<td>−1.448*** (0.177)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Observations</td>
<td>2,834</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>2,912</td>
<td>2,997</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log Likelihood</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>−3,028.015</td>
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<td>Akaike Information Criterion</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td>6,112.030</td>
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</table>

*p < .05. **p < .01. ***p < .0.
from the minimum value of each independent variable to the maximum value, while holding everything else at its mean. The marginal effects plot in Figure 1 indicates that going from the minimum to the maximum score on the racism scale is associated with a 33-percentage point increase in the predicted probability of viewing Trump unfavorably. Similarly, going from a 0 to a 3 on immigrant-linked fate is associated with a 20-percentage point increase in the probability of viewing Trump very unfavorably. The only other variables associated with as large of an effect are the partisan identification variables and age. This finding indicates that racialized discrimination toward Latinos and holding high levels of immigrant-linked fate were influential in shaping views of the 2016 presidential election.

To better understand the nuances of location, national origin, and generation, we ran several additional interaction models for both Trump favorability and political participation. Since the racism scale has greater predictive power in the Trump favorability models, we chose to run interactions with the racism scale and state, national origin group, and generation. After running the interaction models, we plotted predicted probabilities for each interaction using Zelig and ZeligChoice. The full regression tables for each interaction model can be found in the appendix.

Figure 2 displays three interaction plots for Trump favorability. Column 1 displays the predicted probability of viewing Trump very unfavorably when state is interacted with the racism scale. We find that when individuals rank the lowest on the racism index, their probability of viewing Trump very unfavorably ranges from about 32 percent in California to 43 percent in New York/New Jersey. The predicted probability for Arizona has a very wide confidence interval because there are few Latino respondents in the state that are on the low end of the racism scale. The point estimates and confidence bands are all close together indicating that a dislike for Trump is not unique to any particular state. When we set our racism index to the highest level, we find that the predicted probabilities of viewing Trump very unfavorably dramatically increase in every state. Predicted probability point estimates for viewing Trump very unfavorably range from 70...
Figure 2. Trump favorability interaction models.
percent in New York and New Jersey to 84 percent in
Arizona and California.

The middle plot of Figure 2 displays the predicted
probability of viewing Trump very unfavorably when we
interact national origin groups with the racism index. As
with the previous models, a higher score on the racism
index is associated with a higher probability of viewing
Trump very unfavorably. One notable exception is among
respondents of South American origin. For our South
American respondents, a high value on the racism index
is associated with a lower probability of viewing Trump
very unfavorably while a low value on the racism index is
associated with a high probability of viewing Trump
unfavorably. South Americans who score the lowest on
the racism index have a 60 percent predicted probability
of viewing Trump very unfavorably while those who
view racism as a problem the most have only a 55 percent
predicted probability of viewing Trump very unfavorably.

When we look at a simple bivariate relationship
between racism and Trump favorability, we find that
while the majority of South Americans view Trump very
unfavorably, there are few South Americans with high
scores on the racism scale. It seems that for South
Americans, opposition to Trump has more to do with
attacking immigrants and feeling a connection to immi-
grants than racism in American society itself. The racism
scale provides little movement for Cuban Americans, but
for all of the other national origin groups, we see a slight
shift upward in the predicted probability of viewing
Trump unfavorably.

The final column in Figure 2 displays the results of the
interaction between the racism scale and generation. The
results indicate that perceiving high levels of racialized
discrimination is associated with higher levels of dislike
toward Donald Trump among all generations. Our find-
ings show that racialized discrimination played a key fac-
tor in shaping opposition to Trump. Respondents move
from maybe viewing Trump unfavorably to almost cer-
tainly holding a negative view of Trump as perceptions of
racialized discrimination increase.

For our anger models, column 2 in Table 3 presents the
results of anger when immigrant-linked fate, the racism
scale, and Trump favorability reverse coded are all in
the model. We provided this result to show how the size of
the Trump favorability coefficient changes when mod-
cled on its own versus with the racialized identity vari-
ables. However, we focus our attention on column 3,
which excludes immigrant-linked fate and the racism
scale as we have shown above that they are correlated
with Trump favorability. In our models, we controlled for
the same demographic variables used in the previous
model. Figure 3 displays the marginal effect of each
coefficient on the predicted probability of being angry
often or always during the 2016 election. We find that
when compared with all of the other coefficients, dislik-
ing Trump is associated with the largest increase in prob-
ability of feeling angry during the 2016 election. To better
understand this relationship, Figure 4 displays the pre-
dicted probability of being angry often or always during
the 2016 election by how much respondents dislike
Trump. Having a very favorable view toward Trump is
associated with a 20 percent predicted probability of feel-
ing angry often or always during the 2016 election. Those
who have a very unfavorable view or Trump are associ-
ated with a 60 percent probability of feeling angry during
the 2016 election.

Next, we look at what motivated political participa-
tion. Our hypothesis is that Trump angered many Latino
voters, and this anger is associated with an increase in
political participation. Our political participation variable
is the sum of engaging in the five following political
activities: working for a political campaign, donating
money to a political party or campaign, being a member
of a civic group, contacting government officials, and
engaging in political protest. Since our dependent vari-
able is a count, we ran it as a poisson regression. We
expect that anger is going to increase political engage-
ment in all states, for all national origin groups, and
across all generations.

The results from the political participation model can
be found in the last column of Table 3. We find that feel-
ing angry during the 2016 election is positively correlated
with engaging in political activities. A closer look at the
marginal effects in Figure 5 indicates that going from no
anger to being angry is associated with a .29 increase in
the number of political actions voters engaged in during
the 2016 election. The only other covariate that produced
a larger point estimate is education, suggesting that anger
played a significant role in pushing the Latino commu-
nity to engage during the 2016 election. We ran some
additional tests on simplified models using both path
analysis and two-stage least squares to examine the rela-
tionship between Trump favorability, anger, and political
participation. The findings were consistent with our
analysis.

We again ran three additional interaction models to see
if anger influences political participation differently when
interacted with location, national origin, and generation.
The first image in Figure 6 presents the predicted count
when anger is set to the lowest and highest values in each
state. We find that anger works similarly in all states.
Those who are angry are more likely to participate. This
effect is strongest in Florida where the count of actions
increases from 0.35 to 0.90. Californians are more likely
to participate in the low anger scenario, but when anger is
set to its highest level, we find that the point estimate for
the count of political participation acts increases in all
states.
Similarly, we find that when we interact anger with national origin, anger is positively correlated with political participation. We find that anger is especially strong and statistically significant for Dominican Americans. Dominican Americans who are low on the anger scale have a predicted count estimate of 0.18, but when Dominican Americans are high on the anger scale, their predicted count increases to 1.11.

Our final interaction on the last column of Figure 6 displays the predicted count of political participation acts a person engages in when anger is interacted with generation. Once again, we find that anger positively correlated with political participation and that it is especially strong among third-generation respondents. When anger is set at its lowest value, the predicted count of high cost political action is 0.5, but when anger is set to its highest value, the predicted count increases to 0.96. The effect of anger is not very strong among first-generation respondents, but this may be related to the fact that first-generation respondents were not born in the United States, potentially making them more hesitant to participate. Our findings suggest that anger is an effective mobilizer, which is strongly correlated with an increase in political participation.

**Figure 3.** Marginal effect of going from the minimum to the maximum value for each coefficient when modeling correlates of anger.

**Figure 4.** Predicted probability of being angry often or always during the 2016 election.

Similarly, we find that when we interact anger with national origin, anger is positively correlated with political participation. We find that anger is especially strong and statistically significant for Dominican Americans. Dominican Americans who are low on the anger scale have a predicted count estimate of 0.18, but when Dominican Americans are high on the anger scale, their predicted count increases to 1.11.

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in political participation in almost every state, across ethnicities, and spanning multiple generations.

Across thirty-two possible relationships, we find that only one of our interactions goes in the opposite direction than hypothesized. These results suggest that it is not just Mexican Americans who oppose Trump. All Latino national groups who perceive radicalized discrimination and have a sense of immigrant-linked fate disliked the Republican candidate. We suspect that Trump’s threatening rhetoric angered and, thus, mobilized Latinos, and it is a national, pan-ethnic, and multigenerational phenomenon. While we do not have causal evidence, our results tell a compelling story. Immigrant-linked fate and racism are both correlated with disliking the Republican candidate. Those who disliked the Republican candidate were more likely to report feeling very angry during the 2016 election, and those who were angry were more likely to engage in political participation.

**Conclusion and Discussion**

In this paper, we aimed to empirically examine the claim that group threat drove Latino attitudes and political behavior in the 2016 election. We argued that while the focus of the campaign rhetoric coming from Donald Trump primarily targeted Mexican Americans and immigrants, Latinos of other national origins and other subgroups also felt under attack. Despite the diversity of the Latino population, Latinos share a common racialized group. Without a doubt, in the social hierarchy, these same racialization processes deem Latinos as outsiders, regardless of the vast heterogeneity among them.

Extant research has shown compelling evidence that anti-immigrant and anti-Latino rhetoric as well as a threatening political context influenced Latino partisanship, drove naturalization, and heightened turnout among Latinos in California in the 1990s. More recent work has also shown evidence of how threat has driven Latinos to
Figure 6. Political participation model displays the marginal effect of going from the lowest value of each coefficient to the highest value while holding all other variables at their mean.
engage in protests and rallies. This work has shown that the HR 4437 bill proposal in the mid-2000s, also known as the Sensenbrenner bill, triggered national massive protests by Latinos, and other immigrants, who fought for their dignity and humanity in the face of an extremely hostile political context (Zepeda-Millán 2017). Despite the fact that the protesters who partook in the 2006 marches chanted “Today We March, Tomorrow We Vote,” the spillover effects into other types of engagement were difficult to assess. The anti-immigrant and anti-Mexican presidential campaign carried out by Donald Trump in 2016 presented itself as a case of national group threat to the Latino community. Here, we have examined how this particular case drove candidate support and participation among Latinos.

Our findings indicate that perceptions of racialized discrimination toward Latinos as well as immigrant-linked fate shaped Trump’s low favorability among Latinos. We found that this held across the board for Latinos of various national origins, in multiple state contexts and across generational status. We argue that the anti-Mexican and anti-immigrant threats from the presidential campaign and Donald Trump increased the salience of a racialized Latino-immigrant identity. We found evidence that non-Mexicans and U.S.-born Latinos were also influenced by his rhetoric because of their close connection to the issue of immigration. Without a doubt, these sentiments drove Latinos across all national origins, generations, and states of residency to reject the Republican candidate at very high levels.

Furthermore, the findings revealed that Latinos who share an immigrant-linked fate and those who felt that Latinos are racialized were more likely to feel angry during the 2016 election. We also found that those who were angry were particularly mobilized as they felt strongly connected to the immigrant community. Once again, regardless of generational status, national origin, or state of residency, Latinos were eager to participate in various ways because they recognized that they were connected to their immigrant counterparts. While we do not present a causal story, our results suggest that anger played a role in driving favorability toward Trump and mobilizing them. We find that disliking the Republican candidate is strongly correlated with reporting levels of anger. We suspect that given the hostility toward Latinos as well as perceived immigrant-linked fate, the anger that Latinos felt motivated them to engage politically.

Our work has several implications for future research. First, our research suggests that despite the increasing heterogeneity and diversity within the Latino community, there are many things that continue to bind and bring together this community into a cohesive group with political priorities and a political agenda. The way in which members of this community are racialized and treated by others in America suggests that the “Latino” label will continue to have repercussions for decades to come. Second, the findings here show evidence that a nationwide political threat drives favorability and results in greater levels of engagement for Latinos. However, future work must investigate whether or not hostility and threat always result in greater levels of engagement among members of marginalized communities. This is especially the case as scholars have recently shown that threat alone is not always enough and that both threat and mobilization efforts (opportunity signals) are needed to mobilize Latino voters (Cruz Nichols 2017; Reny, Wilcox-Archuleta, and Cruz Nichols 2019). But what is clear from our findings is that threat was mobilizing in 2016, it was mobilizing across a broad spectrum, further unifying and politicizing what it means to be Latino.

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Notes
1. California Proposition 187 was a 1994 ballot initiative to prohibit non-U.S. citizens from benefiting from public services such as health care services and public school education. It passed in a referendum and was later found to be unconstitutional in federal court.
2. In this paper, Puerto Rican is used to describe the Puerto Rican population living in the United States.
4. When asked how important being of their national origin group is to how they see themselves, 55 percent of respondents said very important, 29 percent said somewhat important, and 16 percent said not very or not at all important. Further strengthening the idea that panethnic identity is salient even among those who hold strong feelings about their national origin identity, we find that these two measures are correlated at .81.
5. The U.S. population of the following national origin groups is greater than 50 percent immigrant: Colombia, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Guatemala, and El Salvador. Find the full report at http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/09/15/facts-for-national-hispanic-heritage-month/.
6. Proposition 209 eliminated affirmative action by the state, and 227 sought to create an “English only” school day and remove bilingual education from classrooms.
7. Bill HR4437 more commonly known as the Sensenbrenner Bill passed the U.S. House in December of 2005. This bill...
The results from this analysis can be found in the supplemental material.

13. The literature does not suggest that Central Americans are likely to identify with Republicans. In our sample, only 14 percent of Central Americans identified as Republican. In comparison, 39 percent of Cubans identify with the Republican Party.

14. We also ran a version of the analysis in which we examined Mexican Americans compared with the rest of the sample, Californians compared with respondents living in other states, and first-generation respondents compared with all other generations. The results from these models are consistent with our results when we split the sample into smaller groups. These tables can be found in the supplemental materials.

15. South American will be used to refer to individuals living in the United States who trace their ancestry back to countries in South America.

16. The results from this analysis can be found in the supplemental materials.

Supplemental Material

Supplemental materials for this article are available with the manuscript on the Political Research Quarterly (PRQs) website.

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References


